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ABSTRACT 
Strategic Priorities for Stock Exchanges 
in New EU Member States 
SILVIO J. c ...... ,ILLu .l 
, 
This ttudy discUSUf ,~ strategic priorilie~ (nuJ d,atl .. ltg~J for IUI{,j,iu euM"g~S in "" ... £U 
"",,,,ber Siales, ... 1,11 <1 s,ucioll"(jerena 10 Ihe internal/OMlisa/jon of <tcuriliu mam,.. The ways in 
which exchangn Mt "spending 10 such challMgtl and OIi1er poui/>le co"rsu of action are hlemi}ied. 
These concepu are Ih~" app raised in rela/ion 10 Iht Malta Siock &c!w.ngt. one of Ihe smaliesl ... · 
change. of Ihl "e'" EU _mber ,uues. TM jMtl'fm sizt of Ihi' ... ,hange reveals liIul rhe Malia ~llX:k 
Exchonge is .lHMWMI insu/uud from 1M inu,n",j(m<llisaliOll prouss, >"'/111"" Jlra'tgiu m .... ' be 
"o.'el/ ploltll.d jn order 10 tn'u" comperi/iveneu and profitability. 
I. Ill troduction 
Stcurit;el c:<.ch,:,inge~ play an imporulm role in channelling fMd, from !a.'ers III producrivo Usa$, 
which is an essent i~ 1 pfoce •• for economic development and competitivenen. Thi, study is concerned 
with me dcvelopment prospects for securities exchanges in new EU member states (NEUMS). Til<:: 
paper reviews me nt.:Iin ;"ues impinging on the proaress of (he laller t.'<changc$ .... hich include in· 
creased in(ana(ionalisation. the drive to augment $eCUritics business and .:onwlidate liquidity. and 
more lCTI<1':l1 i,,1IeS suth u the compo:titi'~ edte .... hich may potentially he pined Ihrough technology 
and in'utor proI«Iion. These concepts are of sianificant importanCe ,i~n Wt they dc~orunc the 
futul'<: profitability 300 hence survival of NEU MS $eCUrities exchanges. The ~per then di<;C\lsscs the 
former nOlions in the C<lIIteXt of the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE). Given that the laner is one o(the 
small •• t euhangcs in NEUMS. any ch.a.lle nge$ nuy in fact epitom' $<: in luth a location and pe,h:.p> 
reveal "peculiar" charac~ristic •. 
The p.per i. suuclUred as follows. SectiOfl 2 largdy draws on existing literature and offc,", an 
outline of the stJ1l1eaic priorilie. and challenge$ (or exch.a.nges in NEUMS ..... im a special reference to 
the intemationali!.lltion of securitic. marte", Whil$l the priorities = car.gOOsed in fi"" different lub-
sections, moSt of these are interrelated. The di$Cussion in Section 3 appraises theK tonCC'p!S in .dation 
to the l> ISE. Section 4 concludes. 
2. N EUMS Exchanges 
The member Slales which jo ined the EU i~ 2004 we .. Cypru$. Czech RepUblic. EslOn;a. Hungary. 
Lalvia. Lilhuania. Malia. Poland. Slovakia. an(1 Slovenia. MOSI of the E.ntcm European counllies wcu 
fonnerly planned economiu. and their ~rilies ei(changes "'~'" only SCI up (Of re-t'sl~blished) lately. 
Incre:ISCd foreign banking presences indiCll~ a higher degree of intern&tionalintegr.1lioo ;n lhese coun· 
t:ries. 'The economies of the Medilerranean countries CyplUS and Malia are O\'craU more ~loped as 
compared to the other neW entrants. '" outlined by Facchini and Scgnana (2003), Yet. the lauer coon· 
IIie. · t.'<changeS were t lill SCI up Ia~ly in the 1990's. ),.1o<t of the exch~nges in NEUMS were es!.>b· 
\i'hed in conjunclion ",ilh government privali~tion programmes. whereby share. in previously g\lv. 
em ment-owned institutions wefe sold to me general publi~, 
. Silvio J. Camilleri t..,rut .. at the Dcportm~t of Banking ond Finance, FEMA, Univ.rsity of Malta. 
Most ofthe NEUMS exdtanges are tharacteri7-"d by their smail size and meek liquidity levels, An 
additional Common fa~!()r i~ the modest p",senc. of weH-develop"d institutional invest0r5 which are 
required!() foster trading, inve'tment , and pricing efficiency. According to Clae.lsens el, al. (2003 ), the 
marht capitalisation of these NEUMS BS compared to their GDPs is still low vis-A-vis other EU C<lun-
tries , On the other hand these exchanges typically use mod. m electroni~ trading systems. which give 
lh<:m a competitive edge over other institutions where parts of the process are manual and where there 
are no Central Securities Depositories. 
The exchanges in NEUMS have to compete Wilh ()(her in.titutions in the global markets. including 
the main European exchanges such as Deutsche B6rse. Euronext, and the London Stoe" Exchange. 
The l~tter exchange. typically attract cmos_tistings and C lobal Depo<itory Receipts (CDR.) from Ie .. 
prominent exchanges. and indeed m0'5t of the major exchanges have tier markets which are aimed at 
smaller companies, such as those prevailing in NEUMS. This may partly explain why most of the 
NEUMS exchanges have lost listings as noted by Claessens d. at. (2003). One further factor which 
may explain the loss of listings in NEUMS exchanges is Ihat 'iOme companies were bought by foreign 
institutioos and sul>sequently delisted. 
NEUMS exchanges are currently fadng important strategic i,sues which include dealing with the 
implkations of internalionali,ation , enhancing business and liquidity, reducing transaction costs through 
new technologies, as well a' influencing various ancillary policies which impinge on stock market 
development. The implications of these issues on the profitability and survival of NEUMS exchanges 
a", discussed below. 
2.1 The iruema'ionalhmion clwllenge 
Tc~hnological improvements and deregulation of financial marlets have made it easier for inves· 
tors to access infonnation about foreign securities and to trade such iost.r\lments. This intematiooalisa. 
tion process has led companies to marht their securities to foreign investors. commonly by issuing 
GDRs. TI,ese rec'eip>s are is~ued by financial institutions and are backed by holdings of underlying 
shares , GDRs trade on e,change~ and oveHhe-coumcr markets and pay dividends similarly to the 
underlying sbares , 
An exten;;ive number of securities which were issued by companies in NEUMS were cross· listed 
On larger exchanges, as outlined by Claessens n al. (2003). As NEUMS eventually ~doptthe Eura as 
their currency. One may e"]JeCt that this trend will be facilitated. since it would be easier to manage 
exchange rate rish and in most cas.e.! eliminate them. The main concern about internalionalisation for 
NEUMS exchanges is lhat l>usines~ may be diYerted away 10 larger exchanges. 
The effectiveness of imemationaliz.ation has also been im'estigJted in previous literature. For in-
stance Karolyi (2004) noted that trading acrivity in some depository receipts may in fact be minimal 
due to negligible interest On part of foreign investors. Similarly. Pirrong (1999) and BaruCh. Karolyi 
and I1mmon (2003) consuucted theoretical models predicting that the order flow for a giv~n producl 
tends to converge to a single exchange , One practical reason for this is tim! traders tend to submit orders 
to tho~e markets with higher liquidity, and this diverts orders away from less liquid ones. There are 
""asons to eXp"ctthe home marhtto be a more liquid venue for ".,.:;urities , given that home market 
traders may be following the particular security mo", closely and are more likely to trade immediately 
upon new information releases. When the GDR issue is not of a significant size, participant. in the 
o,'erseas market might not be following su,h developments as closely. 
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Whilst these thQughts may dampen the worries of NEUMS ""changes about internation.1itation. 
one should still consider !he imP'C'S ofthu ""nd. One sal~nt iuue is that !he larger and more liquid 
securities are more likely to be su=sful in cross-listin,~, since these can generate higher 
interut on !he pan of inu,mational im"'st!mi. l1Iertfore, if the order flow relating to the more liquid 
s,""urities migntes """ ..... as. this .... ould translate into considerable lost business fOf the smaller u-
changes. u wen as loss of liquidity. This was confirmed by vari()llS studies 'uch as Levine and Schmukler 
(2003) who siudied d:ua for a large number of &lockl from different countries which accessed o"erseas 
copitilllW\;cu. Karolyi (2002) derived the same result using depository receipts data of companies 
originaling in Latin Amenc.and Asi .. Moe) (200I) used. sampl<: 0(28 stock IllaIUu and found that 
the dedine in Jiquidiry may ,Iso result in reduce4 ability of !he local stock marl:.et to promote economic 
growth. 
Some contrasting evidence was presented by Foerster and Karolyi (1998) who studied transaction 
cost dat. for $lOCks lu ted on the Toronto Stock ExChange. TIle authors found that the stocks that cross-
listed on US uchanges experienced a decline in trantaction casu which they aruiooted to a higher 
C(lI1Ipct;lion for order flow following cross-listing. Yet. one may queStion whetl>er such QUtromes may 
in fact be expected in case of low liquidity llOCks, where the fragmentation may acru.alJy result in two 
illiquid martets. Hargis and Rurwtla.1 (1998) buill I theoretical modcllO examine the cin.:umsWlCeS 
where c!'OiS-listings are likely 10 have positive irnp.aCII no the development of the home markets. TlIey 
concluded the greatest potential for development lies when oecurities from illiquid marka with lower 
degrees of foreign ow~ership. cross-list to more liquid transparent overseas markets. 
When dn.f, ing • """,roe of action on t.ow "-'EUMS eJ<cliange •• hould dnl ,.,ith in'ern.,i"",.li<o'inn. 
one ihould idenlify the facton lhat encourage rll11lllO cross-list in order to address them. One may 
think of different motiv.llions for cross-listing. including the ability 10 tap funds a1 a lower <:OS" broad-
ening the in~scor bas<:. and the plUlige rdate4 10 listing on a biller market. Reese and WcisNdl 
(2002) &ludie4 a eros! section of US banJc depository receipts and argued that one motivation for liSting 
abroad is 10 protecl the interestS of minority shareholders. Similar evidence was found by Pagano tt 111. 
(20(2). La Porta el. ilL (1997) and Pagano and Volpin (2005) preseme<J evidence of the positive corre-
lation bet,.,«n shareholder proceclion and SIOd; markel development Thil implie5 that increased share-
holder prGIcction in the home markel should encourage local trading activity. 
One: policy adopted by exchaniles to Uletle intematiooalization WlIS 10 create alli"""" ..... ith peers. 
A particularly atu:active option for NEUMS exchanges is 10 cooc!ude lilreemenU with lalller exchanges 
given Wt the lauer may present the highest potential for benefit<. Yet. this might not tum OUI to be the 
case in practice. givcn that an agreemeot whereby mo" benefits accrue \0 One party is nOllikely to be 
successful. Concluding an qreement ~ even more complex when issues relating to the financ-
ing of ~ projects ha,,,, to be considered. 
An exchange may collaborate with odJer exchanges or OUl!()\J!U particular funct.iom, as discussed 
by Claessens n. aL (2003). Activitiel; which offer potential for tronnmie5 of scale if condutted jointly 
between exchanges ind ude order ex,""utioo. data wlIehoming, dearing and seulem<:m. information 
dissemination and marketing functions. E, changes mny share the expen~ related to the purchase of 
tailo.-.made systems.. as outlined in Section 2.4. These considerations unders.core 1M imponance that 
IT Iys!ems should be compatible. Nonelbeless. the issues relating 10 financing such projects sliIl emerge. 
'Tberefon:, _g="oa,1> .10""ld tlfOVidc fo.- proccdu.-q "',garding the .solv;,.. of di..,n"", and t'" 'haring 
of potenlial benefits. 
(h",rall . intematiQoalisalion presents a significant challenge 10 NEUMS uchanges. albeit nOl ne<.:· 
euarily rd~ted to EU accession itself The way in which exchanges tackle the ;nlemntionalisation 
challenge ,.,ill impinge on their success. and perhapt survivaL 
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1.1 Incrc()Ji"g busiuu 
Two pre-cooditi0n5 for stock exchange su .... ival arc comp«ili~ and profitabi ~ty;!hese entlll 
institutions to monitor !heir expenditures and re"~nues. As for !he expenditure side, COSt cutlinjl nral· 
egies might no! be optimal since according to ClxSlens er. w. (2003 ) !hey can rmee markets less 
altracti"~. On the OIher hand. if exchanges attempt to increase revenue. throush higher fees. it miahl be 
difficult to attract new listings and 10 discourage stocks from trading abroad, 11$ DOled by Pagano el. a/. 
(2002). One alternative strategy which exchanges may adOpt is to increase !he volume "f busineM. and 
this is imponant to realize economies of scale.' Yet in case of smaller exchanges. it might entail 
collabontion or n"ICJ'ilng with other exchanges for these benefits to malCrillise, U outlined by Ha$an 
and MaiUmaki (2001). 
Enhancing listing and trading activity On cxchanaes is a two-sided effot1, in the sense that both the 
demand and supply of securities hasc to be nunu,..,d. Encouraging investors 10 approach thc market 
entails having an adequate kgal setup in line with international standanls which safegl:3Jds slLarehold-
ern· rights and auarantees effICient services of dispute re$Olulioos. In addilion securities market rea"ll-
lion h.a$ to be cnl'or«d. Tbese issues Me dUcussed further in Section 2.5. 
In enhancing the supply of securities, exchanges C3n waet first-time listing compal.ies 3Ild $Cveral 
programn~s were sel up with this specific aim. Yct, according to Claessens 'I. a/. (2003) the$C initia_ 
lives on part of .. gional exchanaes had limited success. Attracting first time· listing companies. implies 
that f:1[changc.t have to cater for differing listing procet.SC$, since typically !he listing ""Iuiremenl$ of 
such companies arcdifferent from !hose of established companies. """,refore ITIO$l. exdanges oraanise 
different lier markets. since no! all companies can sali,fy stringent requirements. Yet, il is equally 
importanl foruc:h.anges to educate prospective inVCSIon u regards the differe~ MIWttn the compa-
nies listed in different tiel"i of the market. 
Finally, exchange, may also consider generalit'g higher revenues by diversifying in rdated se .... ice~ 
such lIS seulemen! systems and derivatives products, I ltllough the laner usually require well-developed 
underlying matt<:1S. 
Liquidity may be defined as the ease through which 3 trader may transact aU.!S at lCasonable COIit. 
One factor which contributes to .... a.rd1liquid markeu is Ir1>ding activity - !he more active an uset the 
easier it i$ to \ro1$aC1 it. Whilst liquidity is thus .. I*led to the "depth,· of !he marul fi .• . the volllm8 of 
activity in I gr.-en asset). i, is also .. lated 10 !he '"'width·' of the marl;et (i.e. the variety of assets whim 
ate available for tDding). This is due 10 the faclthat investors ~ioo.lly taJ;:~ profit! and substitute 
their assets for OIher ones. thereby gel>CJ"ating mart.et activity. Yet. if the marker offers few pot~ntial 
sUMlitutes, investors might have to hold on to !heir current assets. The .. fore!he liquidity aspecl is 
closely .. laled 10 the objective of increasing business levels. as discussed. in Section 2.2. 
Li'luidity 15 also related 10 internationalisation. given that the laLter may l"C$ult in changes in home 
nwket activity. eon'-ersely,large CJlchan~ have I competitivcedge in temu of theiI ability 10 offer 
Liquidity al a low trading COSI. This implies that increasing liquidity should be a top priority across 
exchanges in NEUMS. 
1 "The existenct of economiu <)( .\Cal. in stoCk exclun~os "IllS COI\firmM II)" H .... " ,,.-I M.l\:irnili (200 I) ;" 
>1\ empirical Sludy of vario<u .. <!wI&" from di/fuenl COIIUnent' .• 
S .. "'" J. C",,1lURI - Stralel:ic Priorities fo.- Stoek Exoh.nges in New EU Member SUte, 
" 
Enhancing liquidity is one of the major objectives of the lIading protocols adopted by e~changes. 
Increasingly. modern markets are relying on automated systems such as electronic oroer-matching fa-
cilities, w~reby oroers queue in an order book aod are then executed through price and tim~ priorities. 
This method of liquidity provision depends on the availability of orders "" t~ opposite side of the 
marht. Therefore. whHst such a feature i~ cost-effective and usually transparent for liquid stocks. it 
might not be sufficient to enSUre liquidity for less popular stocks witb minimum lIading activity. In 
addition, various exchange' prefer to process larger transactions through some deg= of human input 
given that such lIansactions may result in high price <:oncessions and at times.,., interprt:!ed by other 
participants as insider trades ' 
In the absence of large a!llO\lnts of market activity. e .. changes may consider emphasising a "human 
element" to foster liquidity. Market makers hold stocks of assets and may engage in amilIage activities 
that ensure that trading prices d() not diverge materially from fundamental ,·alues. Other participants 
who may provide liquidity are institutional investors: yet the latter may also demand liquidity rather 
than supply it since they often lrade in larg~ amounts. Indeed, institutional inveSlOrS are often uninter-
ested in g~tting invQlved in th()se markets that do not guarantee suiUlble levels of liquidity. 
Feature, Qf the lIading protocol which may impinge on liquidity also include the e .. istence of call 
auctiQn~. Vayanos (1999) argued that call auctions bMCb a number of transactions which might other-
wise execU!e sequentially, and therefore auction, tend to raise liquidity at given points in time. Yet t~ 
entpirical evidence on the CQntribmion of auctions to liquidity is somewhat mixed, and the actual rela-
tionship may also depend on other related mar\(et features such as site and price limits, as discussed by 
KairyS el. al. 0(00)' 
Exchan~ 'hould adopt protocols that enhance marne! liquidity, although inferring whether a pat-
ticular protocol is in fact ()ptimal is not a straightforward task. 
2.4 T~chr!()logy 
E~changes should aim 10 process transactions al a low coS! in the interest of profitability and com-
petitiveness: technology is a decisive fa<:lor which impinges OIl how this objective may be achieved. 
Cost savings may be realised by using the softwareandlor hardware of olber exchanges. In an empiri-
cal study focusing on European exchanges. Hasan and Schmiedel (2004) showed that network coopera-
tion between exchanges may present potential benef!!s induding higher market capitalisation and lower 
Irading costs. Accordiog to Schmiedel (2001). agreements which permit exchanges to join forces and 
invest in • tailor-made system may enhance the operating efficiency of exchanges. In addition, the 
shared costs should make it easier for tbe exchanges to reap the benefits of economies of scale related to 
investing in a new lIading system. 
Such tactics enhance the potential for collaboration with olber e~changes, whilst still retaining the 
distincl identities of the L1tter. Despite this, such agreements may be difficult to conclude sinee these 
entail negotiating the compensation and shared beneft!s, and conflicting ideas may arise when evaluat-
ing subsequent system upgrading and maintenance activities. In addition, if such system sharing sche= 
ore not corefuHy thought out , thcy may ""ult in reduced autonomy for the respective exchanges . 
, The 'pecial characteristic< ofbloek trade. were dioc,,,,od by Tink (1972), Kt'Ous and Stoll (1972). ond 
Ch.\n and Lakooishok (19'95). Huang and Stoll (19'92) diocu<<od til. special ammg=""" whk~ might be 
required for bondling large trades. 
, Empirical studie, on the impacts of ",,11 '''''ti<>nl 00 liquidity include At~ihud ~I. al. (1997), Comen",,-
Foro. (1m), Kenr U al. (2001), Ellul 'I. al. (2003) oDd Camilleri and Groen (2006). 
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2.' Ancillary issuu 
E~challies IDly OIIly prosper if tile development of the un<krlying ~curities mlrut is fastern!. 
This implies that exchmges may benefit from upgrading various ··subsidiary"" items such as securities 
"'gulation.the general legal l.etup. capital market libenlisation. and investor prot«1ion. Whilst some 
of these factors mighl not ronslilUle the iounediate objccti~ of exchanges, the latter should eMu.VOIlr 
10 steer progress in their busine!.S environment. 
For i/lSlance, hi&her investor proteCtion should make it more allractive to hold traded s«urities. 
investor prOteCtion includes an array of i,sues whieh ranie from corpornle governance. timely disclo-
Sure of information and effective auditin, functions which are required to minimize cOfP'X'Ite fmud. In 
addition, investors should be educated u to the way in which they can optimize their pactfolios. includ· 
ing the relative risks anacbe.:l to their holdi"". Similarly. it might be difficult to attnlct instilutional 
investOl1 in the abl.ence Qf an efficient legall.etup. induding facilities for the scttlement of legal dis· 
p.lles within an acceptable time frame. In the absence of impro>~ments io these factOrs. securilies may 
migme to foreign exchanges. This wa$empirically oonfirmcd by Paganoel. 01. (2001), who found that 
European securities tend to CfO!;S·list in countries where investor protection and effident court:; an: 
liven hilloo priorities. 
2.6 O;·~rtJlI no~ 
The above challenges imply that survival of NEUMS &lock exchanges Can be diff,c ul t - in faet. 
according to Claeu.ens ~l. al. (2000) some of these economies may eud up w,tboot exchanges and 
impact \hoe services of other exchanges. Yet this may DOt DeCeSSarily be the case "" ""rh.....-l by K.a~.joecz 
(2002) and Claessens ef. at. (2003). Accordin, to the fonner author. it might not be optima! for a 
country 10 depend on a foreign exchanae, given IMt the ability to mise Ca.pilal might be compromised 
!hauld poIiticaJ. disapeemenl$ arise. Oaesscns ~I. at (2000) also (lUiliDed tile necessity forcoonlric:5 III 
have their own exchanges whose practic<:~ such as listing fees and market tiers are in line witb the 
profile of home companies. Oveneas eXChanges are unlikely to Illilor-mau their requ;~mentl for the 
companie$ of any particular country, e>~n tboo'" they develop various listin& programmeI aimed at 
attractina different company categories. 
Whilsl the glot>al securities marUu are hi&l>ly influenced by the bil names, the rok of smalkr 
stock exch:lng,,", sl\ould IIOt be overlooked. Smaller e~changes shQuld serve as a me3nS through whiCh 
Smaller companies CAn lap funds. Such companies may be well known within their re,ioo however 
they may 6nd the matkclin& campaigns and fee$ involved in listin& OIl a major exchange to be probibi-
live_ Through the ul.e of Ippropria~ teCbnoloa;y and infraIDUCture. the securities listed on smaner 
exchanges may be accessible internationally. This should reduce the tnlditional disadvantages of re-
moteneu from the major flllanc:ial eenu"",, even tbo0lh it does not guanuue.e the interest of oversea!! 
invcstor$. Smaller exchanges may exploit the potential to c= • niche market by retairung panicular 
characteristics, although thi s strategy should nOt compromise the compliance with intemalion,,! sta nd· 
..". 
O Ver1ln, the above Stralegic priorities emphasize the im!X'nance that exchange. should he equipped 
with the appropriate human resOurcel and te<:hnologkal,yStems in order 10 address future challenges. 
lbe above concepts are DOW discw.sed in the context of the Malta Stock E:lcl\ange (MSE). 
3. A case stud!': the Malta Stock Exchange 
Tbere are ""''¢IlI1 reasoos wb~ MSE was selected for this case study. F;"tl)'. this cx<blnge has been 
largel~ unconsidered in similar resean:h papers. Second!y. wben "udying MSE ~ au covering the 
g~neral _urities markets f()l' Malta. given lbat MSE is !he Doll' ex~hange on the islan( and no signifi-
cant o'~r·lbc·counter activity is undertaken. This Is an important feature given th&t in the absence of 
this. !he general securities market of a country may not exactly correspond to the business of the ex-
change. and the research would omil a portion of the sec urities activity. A third reason for focusing on 
MSE is the inbereDt small size: whilsl this is common to mosl exchanges in NEUMS. the problems 
associated with small size tend to epitomize in $Uch I setling . In addition the fact that MSE is smaller 
lban IDO$t other NEUMS exchanges. may also presem ''peculiar'' chanlcteristies thatlR! not ~
on other markcu. Despite these advantages of focusing on MSE, Ibe modest number of securities 
quoted on the exchange does not JftSCnl I siillificam scope for a malbemalical appms.aJ of the above 
~pu. and aqualilativecase study Ipproach may be prdenbk. 
MSE is one of the smallest NEUMS OJichanges. During the initialst.agel. the nUlllbe. of transac-
lions during a typ;c.u MSE trading day did 001. exceed fifty. although tnnnClionl ha~ recently regis· 
tered an enoouraging improvement - for installU !he a>'enge tran,acli""s per day during January 2Q06 
lmounted to around 190. Trading activity is low primarily due to the fact that J small Jl<:JIlllation of less 
than half. million people. ~sull.l in I restricted number of poIcmial investors lind trading requirements_ 
In addition. Maltese individual investors t~nd 10 adOpt "buy and h()ld" Strategies whom they hold par-
ticular &eCurities for a long ""riod of time.' The small size implies that Malta is relatively unimportant 
u compared 10 other emerging markel.l. f'()r ~ample. whilst consi<krable capital flows are directed 
towards developing economies in !,..atin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Malta is virtually exdu<kd 
from the international ;nyeston' map. Emerging mar""t reports do not typically feature Malta as II 
potential SOUrce of financial inveStment and intcm.ltional portfolio managers do nOl pIO\Iide produd~ 
which inVC$t cxclusiv<:ly in this marteL This impinges on liquidity and price efficiency of the market. 
given lhat luger markets Ibn"" on the JftSClIU of institutional inve:llors. 
When MSE W'llll set up in the early 1990·s. tradi~ was manually "",,'h"" .... hy ....... ,nrI 1M """'k_ 
broking firms. lhc dIoi\:e of a manual system was imended to enhance tnlJlsparency through the 
resulting "human bargaining" proceu, Clearing and ~nlemenl ,,~ fully electronic. OllU the market 
develOped, an electronic trailing system was introduced in 1995, and fi.ed commissions were abol-
ished. AI outlined by A7,.wpardi and Camilleri (2003), no significant rrwkel makina, short sale and 
derival;""" activities are conducted on MSE. An Ahcrnative Companies Lisling fllCi!ity was inneduced 
in 1999. which is intended f()l' companies without a trading record.. As at January 2006. the leeuritie.' 
tradin g on MSE comprised 14 eqUitieS. 26 cO<p()rate bonds. as well as several government bonds.' In 
addition, hundreds of invesumnt funds are quoted on th~ e~change. although the latter are not traded on 
tbe market. Whilst these figures might be ellCouraging when consi<kring !he small site of the island, it 
~till remains difficult for the CJlchange to take advant.age of economies of oak Despitelbi,. the opera-
tion' of the exchange have bttn mainly profit.able throughout the pllSt yean. 
Trading tulTl(fVt:f on MSE was traditionally dependent on Ihree equities: lWO rNpr banks and I 
Ideoornmunications company. During the year 200S other equities consolidated thei. relllive impor-
tance on the market. Despite this. equity trading remains une-=Iy disn'ibuted. with sh out of 14 
equities acrounling for around 8S ... of trading >-olume f()l' the year 2O'Y.i.' 
'The ,'oIidity "fthi$ U"'m.-. ~ ~nt ~ <Xlft<idering rhot the less l;quid oecuriti .. on .be 
e' cIw!&e can &0 untra.d<:d foo- do)'l, implying that tke inV(1ton ",ho 1><>Id !he panicular KCIIl1ries.ro IlOl 
tnteres.ted in .. lIing. 110< rd""tano:e of investOrs to h'w:\e froquc:ndy i •• 1>0 'PIl""'" in IIOO_Maltese mark., .. . . 
di",u.se<! by Wan>eryd (2001 : pp.S). 
' Malta Stock Excllange Monthl y Rt)'lOI't. Januiry 2006 . 
• Mi lta Stock Exchange Monthly Rt)'lOI't. D«ember 200S. 
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1be irnp;>et of the in(CrnllionalizatiOll 011 MSE in lenDS of migriliOll of trading activi(y. mainly 
rook place in MallaCOm pie. 1be laue. is • lele<.:ornmuruca(ions company which is ~ of the major 
(faded equities and this C<)nfirms the observation (ha( cross·listing (cnds to be more prevalen( among !he 
major lis(cd compa~ ies. Yel.this particular OOR iss ue docs nOltranspire to have been suC\!essful and 
ac<;Q('(\i"i to Rizzo. Farrugia &; Co. (Stoc kb rokers) Ud. (2003). the amount of outstanding MaltICom 
GDRa de<.:reaw.! from 20'1> to around 3% of the i,.,.,ed share capital. from 1998 to 2003. Tbc re-
conversion of the GDRa imo ordinary shares InIded on the home market implies that there was [imi(ed 
inlefeSt in !he ODR issue _ Qlherwise buying back the lauer inSU\lmc:nts from overseas in,·es(ors would 
h~ve been costly. nus example confirm. the obse ..... ation by Karol y; (2004) !hatwmc ODR in"", 
might tUrn oonnaol and trading activity subs-e<juently flows back to !he home country. 
Signi ficant depository receipts :l<:liv,ty may prove 10 be difficult for n'l<)$t M:ute", companies gi""n 
that majof exchanges u.suaUy expect = -listing rompanies 10 ha"e a trading track ",cord as nOied by 
Kavajen (2002). In addll;OII. for an issue (0 aunet sufficient overseas trading il has to be or a cQmp<e-" 
bensi,"C si~. This further limits the population of Malle'" companies which may .occessfuUy cro5S-
Hst given their limited capitaliutiOll. 
TIle notion that OOR iss~s on pan of Malltse companies may have limited potelllial for success 
still holds when coru;idering the information aspec(, Comprehensive information dis",mina(ioo and 
analysis may nOi malerialiu in case of companiu JUCh , .. "'b!t~ ... ones . ,iv.-n thaI ov~_ ... naly ... 
rnigll1lind these dforu unreUOn3ble in case of IrmJl'5~ed se<.:Urities. 
The fixed COOlS related to cross.lisling should 1150 be considered. Se<:tiOll 3.2 di~lIss« how the 
fi~ed COSts related to • prirmry listing may be high for Maltese companies. given that the limited 
antoun(s of financing which nre usually req uired might nOi justify the OIlllay. This implies that the 
additional COS(S associated wilh obtaining a cross-listing might be even lelo! justifiable, Morro""r, 
primary ~uily i"""s IiSled on MSE are usually oversubKribed. and therefore (he benefits of obtaining 
additional finance through cross·listin, do not seem 10 apply. 
The lbow: arguments imply that the .. (tu-ea(~ for MSE in (CIrnS of cl'Q$S-listings may IlOI. be immi· 
nenl. In fact MSE has IlOI.I05t any listings up 10 now, unlike most OilleT accession country exchanges. 
Yet one should s(ill nOle thaI if such outcomes do occur. their effects DUly be cV<'n w= in case of MSE 
ghen that the order flow is I><:avily dependent on the main equilY issuel. The loss of activity ofany of 
the lauer (nues may ha"" material consequences. 
The same rusonin& may apply to the listings of collective investment scl><:me.s gIven thal &5 ;nves-
lOn gain easier access to informatioo dissemination from foreign exchanges. loch $ehema rni,ht con-
sider delisting after h.-lYing built up a reputation with II><: investing public. Whilst this would IlOI. impact 
on the liquidity of the e~change given that these funds ate nOi actually traded on MSE. such delis(ing$ 
would imply I"¢duced fees for d\e e~change. 
One fin.al quesliOll is whether an exchanie 15 JJDalI as MSE can wrvi,-e the intem",i""~I;uri",, 
tttnd. The Ilfluments Pn:Knted abo\--e luggestlhat Maltese companies Ire currently small by intema· 
tiOllal standards to migra(e to foreign e~changes. Yet, one 5hould not OV<'.look tl><: possibility tlut these 
companies may undergo merger activity wi(h foreign ones, being del'$ted in the proce". with the main 
entity (rading on an overseas exchange. Thus. overal! it is imponant for MSE to endeavour to attract 
SILVIO I. C""lUH' _ SlrIItcgic Prioriliel fo< Stoe\; E.chong .. in New EU Member S .. ",. 
new company listings, both for the purpose of increasing trading activity, as well a, an "insurance" 
against such deli sting posfibilitie$. MSE's involvement in the initiative!o develQP a trading platfonn 
for M.diterranean companies may also address th<! inlemationalisation trend, and perhaps take advan-
tage of it. The next sub-section discusses these altemalives. 
3,2 /ncn!CLSing b«$ine$$ 
The po1ential for MSE to attract new listings from local companies Ii hindered. not only by thc 
small popul ation of firms but also in view of the smal l size of firms The latter element implies that the 
f,xed cos<s related to ao 11'0 and listing may be too high to jU'lify. given the required financing amOunt, 
Pagano if. Ill. (1998) also argued that in cas~ of Italian firms. one panicular factor which contributes (0 
such costs is (nat the final accounts of firms have to be audited prior to listing. and this may result in a 
higher laxation bill. This may be applicahle to Ma1t~se companies as wdL 
These arguments imply that there is • limit.d amount by which MSE can increase it> listing fees. 
Yet (he exchange should not increase listings at any cost ~ firstly. listing fees should enabl~ the n-
change to recoup its own costs , and secondly. international standards should 001 be compromised when 
considering the jisting "com" in term. of increased di",l05ure and management scnlliny. In addition. 
new ~stings should be significant enough to generate pnblic interest and trading , 
One funh<!r factor which MSE has to consider is tbat as the home financial markets develop. com-
panies may obtain increased ac~ss to altemati,'e sources of fmance from venture capital finns and 
other non-bank financial institutions. This would funher reduce the potential 10 attr1tc( new li$lings. 
Given 1M above arguments, MSE should be looking at ways of genornhng new business which are no( 
confined to the listing of hom~ companies in order to $upplement the revenue generat.d by thi~ activity. 
Thi' may explain MSE's recent panicipalion in a project which may polenliolly invoh'e thc setting up 
a trading pl.tfonn for stock! listed on various Meditemlnean exchanges . 
Another potential sonrce of business for MSE might be in se.king \Q auract crosS·jis1ings from 
North African countries . One rationale behind this is that Malta enjoys gOlXlwill from these countries 
because of its reputation of an "inlemt.diary'" between European and North African oounlries. partly 
du~ to its geographical position . Reasons why North African compani~' may be attracted w cross liSI 
on MSE include the geographical proximity and the potential for increased shareholder protection. as 
discussed in Section 2.]. Yel , attracting North African cross -listings i. uOl necessarily an easy objective 
to accomplish. For instance. the in(ereS! on pan of the Maltese public might nOl be high enough to 
aHraCl sig,nifican! amQUnts of funds wwards such companies, Another barrier might be cultur-..:J diff~r­
enc~s given that most North African countri~s follow Islamic finance practic~s. In addition, th~ potcn-
tial for attracting such cross listings on the basis of a superior legal and ,uper.·isory ~up might dimin-
ish as North African countries upgrade their legi,lations and practices. 
Another potential alt~rnativ~ source of rev~nu~ for MSE might be the in1roduction of derivl tive 
products, allhough this entails more developed cash markets and a higher level of im'e&lor education. 
3.3 Enhancing liquid;ry 
Mool of the securilies quoted on MSE are characterised by rclat;;'ely low activity as compared 10 
those quoted on more developed markelS, Given (he market', small size one may encounter situations 
where the majority of tradeM diverge to One particular side of the market. say most tradeM wou ld li ke w 
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sell. This resulu in comparlltivcl)' b.igher price movements. Similarly. institutional investors may im-
pose .. strain on the market if they trade in large quantities. 
As discus~ in Section 2.3, liquidity doe.! not neces,arily increase by a change in the trading 
prOtOCOl. This may be particularly so in case of MSE. Liquidity 00 MSE might increl$e somewhat 
Ihrough achrul&e in the invcston' habilS. when: the lauet monilOr Lhe ~t more closely. trade upOn 
their expectations and take profiu more fn:queml),. This bighli&hts the importance of aiming at • 
higher proponion of suitably informed investors os discus",d in Section 3.5. Su,h factors should also 
promote a mon: effICient pticing process. 
Despite the restrictions in $eConduy nl...ut3CIivity. one should nQle thaI pnmary manet ilSUCS arc 
typically o,""r_sub$cribed. and this may encourage further future liSlings _ albeit the prim:uy market 
activity io terms of new corporate listings h.a.s recently sk>wed down. 
3.4 Tecl!1tolo8Y 
As noted above, it ma), be difficult for MSE 10 rup the bencotits of economiC!; of scale in the 
abse,," of collaboouion with other exchanges. MSE has ilS Q'III'n automated trading system.lOgether 
with a Central Securitie, Depository where the OVo'nership of traded securities is registered . This sYI-
tern may now be C<losidered lIS a sunk COSi. however it might be appropriate for MSE 10 consider 
collaborating with other ,"",changes in sharing the '""'pense of a new tailor-made sySlem in the fulUrC. 
Whilsttbis should be done at 5 Ii ..... when a major component of the trading system nuds upgrading. 
the sening up of collaboration agreement.! should be well·thought in advance. given t!'le PfllCtical diffi-
culties involved as nQ{ed above. In the absence of such collaboration. MSE lihould en,ute that the 
investment in • new system should nOl be exccssivdy costly given that Ibis might translate in prolonged 
lime spent ,n =ouping this!;1lpital expenditure and increased lrInSICtion eosu. 
3.5 Ancillary iuuu 
MSE has a paflicuJar incenth-c to fosler the general <Ie>-clopment of securities market·related as· 
pecu given that these may allraet more inveSlon, and ultimately trading activity to the ~change. As 
discussed. incn:ased shan:bolder ~ should hinder the migration of listed companies to other 
exchanges. Invulor protection impl~5 a number of safegtwds including rigorous procedures to de-
fend minority shareholders and simple procedures for sc:ek'ng redress when a court establishes that 
mideading statements have b«n trutde. Public education programmes should make invc510rs aware of 
such issues. Investor edUClllion programmes are important in the MalteSe setup giv.:n that market 
rneaR:h OIl p:>rI of local brolo:rs may only be feasible if the level of business justifies the n=utCeS 
spent on such lICtivities. Educalioo programmes may partly compensate ror ~Ii. r.c"'.:, "~yen thaI (hey 
enable investors to 1<;eep abreast with the latest company ev~nts and prospects. 
Further desirable pOlicies illClude IIU stability. given that taXation is one of the iOVCStOlS' main 
considerntions prior: to committing their molle),. SimIlarly. the legal and reguLatory setup should nO! 
cause inefficiencies for listed companies since the small size of the latter may translate into consider-
able compli~nce costs . Whilst indusU')l standards in terms of disclosun: and related items should 001 be 
compromised. one musl eruun: thaI complying with listing requiremeolli does IlOl translate mto an 
unneeesa.ary burden. The improvements in the legal and ",gulatory sc:tup should not tum into exc ... 
bureaucracy. 
" 
3.6 ~r"lI1Wr~ 
The opt:ralioos of MSE have been profitable up [0 now and the e.change has nO! suffered a"y 
material consequences from migration of stocks. Yel. the excbange sboold endeavour [0 ".stain ;IS 
profitability in "jew of possible increased competition, including competilion 11 the European level. 
Oi\'en this, any outlays on long term investment should be thoroughly evaluated in order 10 ensure (h"1 
iu(h COSl.\ are justifiable in view of the current market activity. One possibility is 10 seek ag,cernenU 
,..llb 0Iher ~changes in order \0 share liignificant expenses and possible benefill. Yet. r,nding inter_ 
ested parties and implementing such agrteIDenll may be challenging. 
Up 10 now. 011<: rnain liwlIi sou,..;e for M<;E "'8$ the priVtii ... lion of &<)vernmcnt cntitico. MSE 
$hOOk! now focus on allJllCling ~ listings from private limited companies and smalla" blWne$5eS. 
This .... ould be in line wilh the objective of assisting the financing aaivilies of home oompanie., mo>sl of 
which operate on a small scale. Yet. given tile limited nurnl>er of local companies and thaI their siu 
might not justify the listing COIlS, MSE ~hould also endeaYOlJr to attru:l a hiaheT degree of overseas 
regional business as discussed above, 
4, Conclu s ion 
This analysis described !he current challenges for securities exchanges in NEUMS and outlined 
strategic considcratioos and pouible actions which should be evaluaied in Addressing such fac:tor$. A 
case study focussing 00 MSE applied these lines of i.booghtto a small nwket wouing. Despite thai MSE 
is somewbat "insulated" from current internationalization trends. it should !till Rim 10 generate addi · 
tional business in order to sustain profitability. 
Whilst txchan&es will be ley players in determining Jmy.. such challenges will be addressed, tile 
ponible COIIrse! of action do not depend entirely on!hese institutions but also on policy makers and 
other participants in the securities marketS such as regulato<s, instilutional investO<S ""d tile companies 
seeking finance. This implies !hal tile exchanges' hum"" resources who get in\'OI,"ed in external con-
taw are one key element in influencing whether and how additional business may be generated. This 
be<:omes even more evident when considerinll thai possible COII=5 of acrion include '!rIue,1e alliances 
with othe.- exchanges. 
This study has largely assumed thaI companies shall C(lntin ue to demand Ille ..,rvi~ of secnritie.1 
exchanges. 'I least at Ihe regionallc\lel. This is a reasonable as!lumption in the $bon 10 medium lenn. 
Yet, excbanges should abo consider the possibility that in the longer tenn securities activity might 
accrue 10 a wolect number of large exchangel and oomputeri,ed a1t~mali"e lrading systems. If this 
occun, tile ~orvival of VlIrious exchanges - including those in NEUMS - might be compromised. 
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